Epistemic and Moral Normativity
We can evaluate beliefs from both ethical and epistemic perspectives. But what is the relationship between the two? How can we be responsible for beliefs? Do moral considerations bear on epistemic appropriateness of belief? Can we wrong others merely by believing certain things about them?
Subjective and Objective Normativity
It seems that we can be criticised for the way we form our beliefs independently of whether they are true. But is there such a thing as subjective normativity? Is what we ought to do relative to what we rationally believe? Does epistemic uncertainty about what the right thing to do is make a difference to what we ought to do? Must we have competent beliefs about reasons to be rational? When are intuitions or emotions competent?
Morality and Social Epistemology
Much of what we know we learn from others. But who should we trust and why? What if we fail to trust someone because of prejudice? What does epistemic injustice look like on a structural rather than individual level? What is moral expertise? What does it take to have moral understanding? And when can we outsource moral deliberation to others?